Draft Amendments to Egypt’s Competition Law

On 6 April the Egyptian Senate approved draft amendments to the Egypt Competition Law. The proposed amendments, which are still pending final approval by the House of Representatives and subsequent ratification by the President, include organizational changes to the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA), give the ECA authority to directly impose fines without cooperation with the courts, increase the caps for fines, establish a designated committee to review appeals of decisions of the ECA, and introduce a market share threshold at which undertakings are considered to have a dominant position in a market.

Institutional reform

The amendments would elevate the ECA to become an independent regulatory body with full legal personality. The ECA would report directly to the President of the Republic instead of the Cabinet. Furthermore, the amendments alter the governance structure of the ECA. They introduce new provisions governing board composition, executive management, disciplinary frameworks, and operational mandates. The Board of Directors would be reduced from ten members to seven, excluding government and union representatives to reinforce neutrality and reduce institutional influence.

Enhanced enforcement powers

The amendments significantly expand the enforcement powers of the ECA by granting it authority to impose administrative financial penalties directly, without requiring prior court judgment. In determining penalties, the ECA must consider factors such as the severity and duration of the infringement, the nature of the conduct, and the violator’s revenue or value of their assets.

Aside from granting the ECA authority to directly impose fines, the amendments also increase fines. Violations of behavioral antitrust prohibitions can now be penalized with fines of between 2 and 15%—instead of formerly 2 to 12%—of the revenue related to the violation. Where the revenue related to the violation cannot be assess, fines are capped at EGP 2 billion (approx. USD 38.6 billion). Failure to notify economic concentrations or gun jumping is now subject to fines of 2 to 12% of the violating parties’ annual turnover, value of their assets value, or transaction value; compared to previously 1 to 10 percent. In addition, the amendments provide that failure to comply with orders of the ECA can be penalized with fine of 1% of annual turnover, capped at EGP 100 million (approx. USD 1.93 million). Additional procedural penalties are introduced for failure to appear before the ECA without acceptable justification and for refusal to comply with ECA decisions.

However, the amendments do not clarify whether fines will be calculated on Egyptian or worldwide turnover or assets. This was initially unclear under the Competition Law. The ECA has so far held that it was not for them to determine this issue. Since the fines had to ultimately be issued by the court under the current law, the ECA referred to the courts to determine this issue. To date, the courts did not have the opportunity to address the matter. With the ECA gaining the power to impose fines directly, it remains to be seen how the ECA will position itself in the matter.

Appeals mechanism and judicial oversight

The draft amendments establish a new independent committee chaired by the Vice President of the State Council to review appeals against ECA decisions. ECA decisions remain immediately enforceable, and binding. Appeals do not automatically suspend enforcement unless a competent court orders otherwise.

Expansion of substantive competition rules

The reform broadens the substantive scope of prohibited conduct. The definition of “dominance” is aligned more closely with European competition law concepts, extending beyond formal ownership thresholds to include situations where a company can exert significant influence over pricing, supply or other market conditions. Undertakings with a market exceeding 50% are deemed dominant. However, they may still rebut the presumption. Also, where an undertaking has less than 50% market share, it may still be deemed to be dominant, if they nonetheless can significantly influence market conditions. Hence, the 50% threshold effectively serves as a threshold for inversion of burden of proof. Where an undertaking has less than 50% market share, it is upon the ECA to establish dominance. Where an undertaking has 50% market share or more, the undertaking must rebut the presumption that they are dominant.

The amendments also expand the scope of prohibited horizontal agreements. They now explicitly include coordinated conduct and informal practices, even in the absence of explicit agreements. Such conduct is arguably also caught under the current law. Still, the clarification underscores this. Additionally, restrictions on dominant market players are broadened to include practices affecting resale pricing autonomy. RPM was already regulated by the general provisions on behavioral antitrust matters. The amendments now explicitly include provisions concerning dominant undertakings. Still, we expect general practice on RPM concerning non-dominant undertakings to continue to apply.

Furthermore, the amendments seek to increase efficiency of enforcement by strengthening the leniency program to encourage early reporting of anti-competitive conduct. The new provisions include protection of whistleblower identity and incentives for first-in reporting.

However, the amendments also formally introduce the concept of “economic efficiency”. This concept allows certain restrictive agreements to be exempted form the application of the antitrust provisions, where they generate demonstrable technological or consumer benefits.

Market and investment impact

The legislator aim to with these amendments strengthen deterrence, increase regulatory intervention capacity, and accelerate enforcement procedures. For businesses, the reforms introduce heightened compliance obligations, increased financial exposure, and expanded scrutiny of both formal and informal market conduct. At the same time, the reforms aim to improve market fairness, support SMEs, and enhance investor confidence by ensuring more predictable and transparent competition rules. The enhanced independence of the ECA is intended to further reinforce regulatory credibility and reduce perceived political or administrative interference. Businesses operating in Egypt will need to reassess compliance frameworks, particularly in relation to market conduct, merger activity, and regulatory engagement with the ECA.