ECA Issues Guidelines on Competition in Digital Markets

In October 2025, the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) published guidelines on the application of the Egyptian Competition Law to digital markets. The Guidelines do not create new legal obligations. Instead, they clarify how the ECA intends to apply existing competition rules to digital platforms and data-driven businesses.

For companies operating in Egypt’s digital economy, the Guidelines are important because they explain how traditional competition concepts will be adapted to platform markets, zero-price services, data-driven business models, and digital ecosystems.

Why Digital Markets Require a Different Approach

Digital markets do not always fit neatly into traditional competition law analysis. Many platforms operate across multiple user groups, offer services at no direct monetary price, benefit from network effects, and accumulate large volumes of user data.

The ECA identifies several features that are particularly relevant to competition analysis in digital markets. These include multi-sided platforms, network effects, data access, economies of scale and scope, zero-pricing strategies, and users’ ability to multi-home.

Multi-sided platforms require careful market definition. Where a platform facilitates direct transactions between different user groups, such as buyers and sellers or drivers and passengers, the ECA may treat both sides as part of one relevant market. Where a platform serves user groups independently, such as users and advertisers on a social media platform, each side may be assessed separately.

Network effects are also central. As more users join a platform, the value of the platform often increases, making it more difficult for new entrants to compete. This may reinforce an incumbent’s market position over time.

Data access is another key factor. Platforms that accumulate large datasets can improve personalization, pricing, advertising, product development, and user engagement. These advantages can be difficult for smaller competitors to replicate, particularly where data is essential to competing effectively.

Zero-pricing further complicates traditional analysis. Many digital platforms offer services for free to users and monetize through advertising, subscriptions, or data-driven services. In such markets, price alone may not reflect market power. Users may not pay money, but they provide value through attention, data, and engagement.

Assessing Market Power in Digital Markets

The Guidelines preserve Egypt’s existing dominance threshold of market share exceeding 25 percent. However, the ECA recognizes that revenue-based metrics may understate a platform’s true market position where services are offered for free or where value is generated indirectly.

As a result, the ECA identifies alternative indicators for assessing digital market power. These may include active users, platform visits, completed transactions, time spent on the platform, downloads, and search volume.

Each metric serves a different purpose. Active users may be more relevant than registered users where many accounts are inactive. Platform visits may be important for advertising-driven markets. Completed transactions may matter more for ride-hailing, food delivery, or hotel booking platforms. Time spent may be especially relevant for social media, streaming, and content platforms.

The Guidelines therefore signal that the ECA will look beyond formal revenue and pricing data when assessing whether a digital platform has market power.

Barriers to Entry and Expansion

The ECA also identifies several features that may create barriers to entry or expansion in digital markets.

Network effects can make it difficult for new entrants to attract users, even where they offer comparable or superior products. Single-homing can strengthen this effect where users rely on one platform due to switching costs, data portability limitations, or ecosystem lock-in.

Data access may also create barriers. In markets such as search, targeted advertising, and AI-enabled services, large proprietary datasets can be a critical input. Smaller competitors may struggle to compete if they cannot access equivalent data.

Digital ecosystems can further limit competition where users become dependent on a platform’s integrated services, applications, payment systems, or social connections. Even without formal exclusivity, these ecosystems may make switching difficult.

The ECA also recognizes access to capital as a potential barrier, particularly where incumbents can influence rivals’ financing through minority investments or veto rights. This is significant because it links digital market power not only to commercial conduct, but also to transaction structures that may reinforce incumbency.

Conduct Likely to Raise Competition Concerns

The Guidelines identify several categories of conduct that may raise concerns under existing Egyptian competition rules.

For dominant platforms, prohibited conduct may include tying and bundling, predatory pricing, self-preferencing, discriminatory treatment, denial of access to essential facilities, price parity clauses, resale price maintenance, restrictions on passive sales, and killer acquisitions.

Several of these concerns are closely connected to platform structure. A dominant platform may use its position in one market to advantage its own services in another market. It may prioritize its own products in rankings, limit rivals’ visibility, or bundle services in a way that makes it harder for competitors to reach users.

Access restrictions may also attract scrutiny. Where a platform controls important digital infrastructure, such as data, operating systems, or technical interfaces, limiting competitor access may constitute abusive conduct if no viable alternative exists.

The Guidelines also address algorithmic enforcement of commercial restrictions. For example, resale price maintenance may arise where algorithms monitor distributor pricing and effectively turn recommended prices into fixed or minimum resale prices.

Contractual restrictions are another focus area. Broad price parity clauses, discriminatory treatment of business users, and restrictions on passive sales may reduce platform competition or limit user choice. The ECA also highlights concerns around “killer acquisitions,” where a dominant platform acquires a nascent competitor to eliminate a future competitive threat. Even if such a transaction falls below merger control thresholds, the ECA may review it after closing where there is evidence of harm to competition.

Practical Implications for Digital Businesses

Although the Guidelines do not create new obligations, they provide a clear indication of the ECA’s enforcement priorities. Businesses operating digital platforms, marketplaces, app-based services, data-driven products, or AI-enabled tools in Egypt should assess their conduct through the lens of the Guidelines.

This includes reviewing platform design, ranking mechanisms, access policies, data practices, exclusivity arrangements, pricing restrictions, parity clauses, and rules affecting multi-homing or switching.

Dominant platforms should be particularly careful. Practices such as self-preferencing, tying, bundling, discriminatory access, or limiting interoperability may attract greater scrutiny where they reinforce market power or restrict competitors.

The Guidelines also have implications for M&A. Acquisitions involving emerging competitors, valuable data assets, or early-stage digital businesses may draw attention even where they do not meet traditional notification thresholds.

Speak With Bremer About Digital Markets Compliance in Egypt

The ECA’s Guidelines show that digital markets are becoming a priority area for Egyptian competition enforcement. Bremer advises clients on competition law, merger control, data-driven business models, and regulatory risk across Egypt and the broader region.

If your business operates a digital platform or is considering a transaction involving Egypt’s digital economy, Bremer can help assess risk and plan next steps.